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THE BASIC RULES OF DISCLOSURE
The Securities Act of 19331 ("1933 Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 ("1934 Act") were enacted principally to
' Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter "1933 Act"]. The 1933 Act requires
the initial registration of all publicly traded securities, see id. § 77e, and broadly defines a
"security" as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate .... any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security,"... [any] warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing.
Id. § 77b(1).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter "1934 Act"], con-
tains a comparable definition. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
The securities laws were enacted following the stock market crash of 1929 to satisfy the
recognized need for statutory regulation of the securities exchanges. See Landis, The Legis-
lative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959). This need
arose from insufficient self-regulation on the part of the exchanges and the increasing im-
portance of the stock markets to the economy. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 351 (1963); see also Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government
View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 6, 9-10 (1959) (discussing lax financial and ethical standards
that precipitated drafting of securities laws). Nonetheless, the 1934 Act allowed the ex-
changes considerable powers of self-regulation and created the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the possibility of civil liability as an enforcement mechanism. See
Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange
Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120, 1123-25 (1970).
The Securities Act of 1933 followed a generation of state regulation and centuries of
legislation in England. See generally L. Loss, FuNDs ENTALs OF SEcuarrMs REGULATION 1
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing history of market regulation); James, The Securities Act of 1933,
32 MICH. L. REv. 624, 624-30 (1934) (discussing factors that prompted enactment); Knauss,
A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 610-13 (1964) (English law
was basis for development of United States' securities laws).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The 1934 Act requires continuing
corporate compliance with disclosure rules following initial registration of their securities
pursuant to the 1933 Act. See Knauss, supra note 1, at 608. This responsibility continues as
long as the company's securities are traded on a national exchange. See id. Commentators
have suggested that the sporadic disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act should be super-
seded by the continuous disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act, and that the two acts
should be coordinated into a comprehensive disclosure law. See Cohen, "Truth in Securi-
ties" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1402-08 (1966); Knauss, supra note 1, at 628-30.
Prior to the 1934 Act, corporate disclosure was governed by the rules of the various
exchanges, and arguments were enunciated against passage of the 1934 Act. See Seligman,
The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP. L. 1 (1983),
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protect investors in registered securities.3 The primary vehicle for
this protection has been full and accurate disclosure of all "mate-
rial" facts relating to such securities,4 as required, in part, by sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act' and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereun-
reprinted in 16 SEC. L. Rlv. 3, 4-11 (1984) (criticisms of disclosure requirements); see also
Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 33 U. MIMn L. REv. 1471, 1480-83 (1979) (passage of 1934 Act and re-
quired disclosure ineffective to prevent investor loss). Congress established the Securities
and Exchange Commission to enforce the securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982). Prior to the 1934 Act, securities regulation and enforce-
ment was entrusted to the Federal Trade Commission. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(5), 15
U.S.C. § 77b-5 (1982).
' See Wolfson & Russo, supra note 1, at 1147. The 1934 Act contains approximately
fifty references to the goal of protecting investors. Id. The legislative history of the securi-
ties law is replete with references to the protection of investors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933) (broad purpose of securities legislation is to protect investors);
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (providing regulation of exchanges for protec-
tion of investors) (President Franklin D. Roosevelt). The Supreme Court has also recognized
this fundamental goal of the securities laws. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (purpose of 1933 Act to protect investors in registered securities);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (purpose of 1933 Act to protect inves-
tors and to promote honesty and fair dealing); see also Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corpo-
ration's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935, 942 (1979) (principal purpose of
securities laws to protect investors).
4 See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMM'N, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1 (1963) ("keystone of the
entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure"). The exchanges themselves
have recognized that the crux of a stable market is disclosure. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE LISTED ComPANY MANUAL § 2, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1123,515, at
17,211 (1987) ("sound corporate disclosure policy is essential to the maintenance of a fair
and orderly securities market"); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GumE § 401, re-
printed in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,124A, at 17,097 (1985) ("conduct of a fair and
orderly market requires every listed company to make available to the public information
necessary for informed investing"); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963) (fundamental purpose of the securities laws was "to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor"); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430
(1953) (act designed to protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosure); In re Carna-
tion Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,801 (July 8, 1985) ("importance of accurate and complete issue disclosure to the
integrity of the securities markets can not be overemphasized"). See generally H.R. Doc.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933) ("[this proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat
emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware' ") (President Franklin D. Roosevelt);
H. KRn'KE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
(1979) (discussing corporate disclosure); Seligman, supra note 2, at 11 (fraud, insider com-
pensation, and lack of public confidence prompted mandatory disclosure requirements).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). This section
provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
1988]
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der.' Over the years, courts have struggled to define materiality' so
as to best satisfy the inapposite needs of corporations for silence
and of investors for information.8 The courts have sought to estab-
lish a flexible but clear rule' in order to provide a standard for
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
, See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC pursuant
to the express grant of authority in section 10(b). See supra note 5 (text of § 10(b)). Rule
10b-5 provides, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading...
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have been the source of voluminous and significant litiga-
tion. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("[w]hen we
deal with... Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than
a legislative acorn"); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (§ 10(b) and rule
10b-5 may be the most litigated provisions of federal securities law); see also Jacobs, What
is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule 10b-5?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 243, 243
(1973) (rule 10b-5 is most powerful and widely used instrument of federal securities reme-
dies). See generally Note, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the Sec-
ond Circuit Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 78, 88-90 (1986) (discussing history, en-
actment, and interpretation of rule 10b-5); Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM.
& MARY L. Rv. 860, 864-67 (1972) (historical background of rule 10b-5).
Some limitations have been imposed on actions brought pursuant to rule 10b-5. See,
e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty, absent
deception, does not give rise to 10b-5 claim); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201 (scienter neces-
sary element of 10b-5 claim); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.)
(only actual purchasers and sellers have standing to sue under rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731 (affirming Birnbaum rule).
' See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
8 See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) ("adherence to
[a materiality standard will ensure] management's disclosure obligations will strike the cor-
rect balance between the competing costs and benefits of disclosure"), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1015 (1986); see also Bauman, supra note 3, at 988 (corporation's duty to disclose "requires
balancing corporation's need for silence against investors' need for disclosure"); Note, Rule
10b-5 and the Corporation's Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations: A Proposal for a Safe
Harbor from the Storm of Uncertainty, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 731, 732 (1987) (disclosure
policy must balance competing interests of corporations and investors).
9 See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985).
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corporate disclosure upon which both corporations and courts
could rely.10 These conflicting goals have resulted in inconsistent
rules of disclosure, particularly in the context of early corporate
merger negotiations." In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,12 the Supreme
Court set forth the appropriate treatment of the materiality issue
in 10b-5 actions.' 3 The Court rejected a number of circuit court
decisions which had found certain preliminary merger negotiations
"immaterial as a matter of law," holding instead that such a deter-
mination required an inquiry into the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case.'4 It is submitted that by relying on a case by
case approach, and by declining to reach the timing of disclosure
issue, 5 the Court has left corporations without a reliable method
by which to ascertain when a legal duty to disclose certain facts
arises. It is further suggested that the Court inadvertently im-
paired the application of summary judgment to section 10(b)/rule
10b-5 disclosure actions. This Note will review the development of
the materiality standard and the ensuing conflict among the cir-
cuits, discuss the Supreme Court's attempt to settle this conflict,
and suggest several questions regarding corporate responsibility to
disclose that remain unanswered after Basic.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATERIALITY STANDARD
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in TSC Industries
v. Northway, Inc.,"6 various standards of materiality had been
enunciated and applied by courts. 7 In TSC, the Supreme Court
10 Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177-78 (7th Cir.) (unclear standard would lack
staying power and be fertile ground for dispute), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); see also
Special Report, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 682, 684 (May 8, 1987)
(unclear disclosure rule common management complaint).
n See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
22 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
13 See id. at 983-84.
1 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
16 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
27 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970) (suggesting
"might" test to determine materiality). A misstatement or omission in a proxy statement
was considered material if "the defect was of such a character that it might have been con-
sidered important by a reasonable shareholder.., in the process of deciding how to vote."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972) (applying Mills test in rule 10b-5 case). However, the "might" test has been criticized
as an inaccurate interpretation of Mills, see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1301 (2d Cir. 1973) ("might" was "not in fact intended to establish a definition of material-
ity"), cited with approval in TSC, 426 U.S. at 448-49, and as providing too low a threshold,
1988]
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considered earlier standards and concluded that in order for a fact
to be material, "there must be a substantial likelihood that the dis-
closure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasona-
ble investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of infor-
mation made available."'" Although TSC discussed the issue of
materiality in the context of a proxy solicitation, it provided the
test generally adopted by courts in a variety of securities settings."9
Previously, with regard to future contingent events, the Second
Circuit had defined materiality as involving a balancing of the
"probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magni-
tude of the event."20 Whatever the test and whatever the context,
however, courts have been aware that too low a materiality thresh-
old could threaten the stability of the securities markets and un-
dermine the fundamental purpose of disclosure.2' In TSC, the Su-
implying required disclosure even for hypothetical situations. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1302. The
Gerstle court relied on language in Mills which indicated that the omission or misstatement
must have a "'significant propensity to affect the voting process,'" id. (quoting Mills, 396
U.S. at 384), and stated that the "might" test was dicta. Id. at 1301.
A somewhat higher "would" standard has also been applied to materiality questions.
See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
In List, the court held that the test is whether" 'a reasonable man would attach importance
[to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action.' " Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 538(2)(a) (1977)). The Second Circuit subse-
quently refined the "would" standard. See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d
159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). The General Time test is
whether "there is a substantial likelihood that the misstatement or omission may have led a
stockholder to grant a proxy... or to withhold one.., whereas in the absence of this he
would have taken a contrary course." Id. It is suggested that this standard implies that in
order to be material, a fact would have to be determinative of an investor's decision.
Some courts have undertaken a "balancing" test to determine when disclosure of con-
tingent facts would be required. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test); Radiation Dy-
namics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972) (same).
18 TSC, 426 U.S. at 449.
19 See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.) ("like every other court of
appeals we have taken the definition [of materiality] in TSC as suitable for the term wher-
ever it appears in securities law"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); see also Michaels v.
Michaeis, 767 F.2d 1185, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1985) (standard applied to 10b-5 claim in closely
held corporation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196,
1204-05 (3d Cir. 1982) (standard applied to plans to search for white knight and preliminary
merger negotiations).
20 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849.
21 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir.
1969) ("[i]t would be as serious an infringement of these regulations to overstate the defi-
niteness of the plans as to understate them"); see Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d
231, 239 (6th Cir. 1985) ("a deluge of information... would be more likely to confuse than
guide the reasonable lay shareholder"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); see also Note,
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preme Court recognized this potential problem and cautioned that
the standard of materiality must be high enough to avoid the pos-
sibility that management might bury shareholders in an "ava-
lanche of trivial information. ' '22
Prior to Basic Inc. v. Levinson, some courts had developed a
threshold before which facts concerning preliminary merger negoti-
ations were "immaterial as a matter of law" and challenges of al-
legedly improper nondisclosure of these negotiations were summa-
rily dismissed.2 3 The rationale for this approach was based
primarily on three theories: first, the negotiations were considered
too speculative and premature disclosure might mislead investors
into believing their outcome was more certain than it actually
was;24 second, premature disclosure could frustrate completion of a
transaction because investor activity following disclosure might
Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate Statements, 96
YALE L.J. 547, 547 (1987) ("[p]remature disclosure . . . poses a substantial threat to
investors").
22 TSC, 426 U.S. at 448. The Court also said that "the disclosure policy embodied in
the ... regulations is not without limit" and that "[s]ome information is of such dubious
significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good." Id.; see
also Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198, 210 (2d Cir. 1980) ("disclosure ...
must steer a middle course, neither submerging a material fact in a flood of collateral data,
nor slighting its importance through ... cavalier treatment"). The Greenapple court illus-
trated the conflicting interests of disclosure by comparing the policies underlying "Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973) ('it is not sufficient that overtones
might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts') [with] Rich-
land v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. [538,] 554 [(S.D.N.Y. 1967)] ('corporations are not required to
address their stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten')." Greenapple, 618 F.2d
at 210.
22 See Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207; see also Starkman, 772 F.2d at 243 (affirming district
court grant of summary judgment because duty to disclose arises only after price and struc-
ture have been fundamentally agreed upon); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11,
14 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Staffin and affirming summary judgment).
24 See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
157 (1987); see also Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14 (uncertainty surrounding merger negotiations may
cause disclosure to be more misleading than secrecy); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196,
1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (disclosure of preliminary merger discussions immaterial because disclo-
sure may be misleading); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-
85 (5th Cir. 1970) (misleading to stockholders and investing public to indicate a plan or
proposal to merge which never got off the ground); AMERucAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
GumE § 402(a), reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,124B, at 17,097-11 (1985) ("Oc-
casionally, corporate developments give rise to information which, although material, is sub-
ject to rapid change.... [I]t may be proper to withhold public disclosure until a firm an-
nouncement can be made, since successive public statements... may confuse or mislead the
public rather than enlighten it."). However, the validity of this justification for nondisclo-
sure has been criticized. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 984-85 (rejecting confusion of investors as
rationale for nondisclosure); Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1175 (notion that disclosure may be mis-
leading "assumes that investors are nitwits").
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change circumstances so as to make completion of the transaction
economically infeasible; 25 and third, a corporation could be subject
to liability for premature disclosure of contingencies which fail to
come to fruition.26 Even those circuits accepting one of these theo-
ries, however, disagreed as to the development and implementation
of the "immaterial as a matter of law" standard.27
CONFLICT IN "IMMATERIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW"
One disagreement that emerged among the circuits acknowl-
edging the applicability of an immateriality threshold concerned
the point at which that threshold was met.28 In Staffin v. Green-
berg,29 the Third Circuit provided a test pursuant to which all pre-
liminary merger negotiations were immaterial prior to an "agree-
ment in principle" or the "functional equivalent" of such an
agreement.30 Two years later, in the sharply criticized case of
21 See Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1175-76; Note, supra note 8, at 739-40 (public knowledge or
suspicion of merger negotiations precipitates trading, which forces market price towards
tender offer); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 708-09 (1984) (mandatory disclosure may terminate merger
negotiations and reduce shareholder returns). This concern is most evident in the merger
context because disclosure of merger negotiations often raises the market price of stock to-
wards the expected tender price, see, e.g., Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp.
128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (merger rumors caused market activity), and the offeror may be
forced to abandon his plans. See Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Mr. Calvin on behalf of New York Stock Exchange,
suggesting disclosure of preliminary merger discussions would do more harm than good)).
21 See Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14 (had corporation disclosed negotiations, and had they
failed, corporation would be liable for such disclosure); Susquehanna Corp., 423 F.2d at
1086 ("next case may well be one in which exaggeration and overstatement is the basis of
attack"); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 252, 256 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (disclosure of
preliminary negotiations makes corporation vulnerable to lawsuit charging the disclosure
was misleading). For an example of an action brought for disclosure of affirmative predic-
tions which failed to materialize, see Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1068 (2d Cir. 1985).
But see Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of
Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 93, 95 (1986) (criticizing rationale justifying
nondisclosure).
27 See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
28 Compare Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) (issue mate-
rial once price and structure agreed upon), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) and Flamm,
814 F.2d at 1169 (same) with Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986)
(merger negotiations material once corporation makes public disclosure), vac'd, 108 S. Ct.
978 (1988) and In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801 (July 8, 1985) (merger negotiations may be mate-
rial long before agreement as to price and structure).
29 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 1207. The court found that under the facts, such an agreement had not been
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Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 31 the same court defined an "agree-
ment in principle" as one in which the parties had reached agree-
ment as to the price and structure of the transaction.2 A four-
prong rationale was offered to support this "bright line" price and
structure rule: first, price and structure are two critical factors of
any merger; second, agreement as to price and structure provides
concrete evidence of a "mature understanding between the negoti-
ating corporations"; third, the price and structure rule provides a
usable and definite measure for deciding the time for disclosure;
and fourth, once price and structure are agreed upon, there is min-
imal chance that disclosure will disrupt the transaction or mislead
the investing public.33 This "bright line" price and structure rule
was subsequently adopted by a number of courts 4 and found sup-
port in the rules of the exchanges.35 However, the price and struc-
reached and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id.
31 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). Greenfield has been
criticized as having confused the issue of nondisclosure and materiality with the wrongful
issuance of a "no corporate development" statement. See, e.g., Basic, 786 F.2d at 748-49
("Greenfield court's reliance on Staffin was clearly misplaced"); Schlanger v. Four-Phase
Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Greenfield... is wrong, essentially be-
cause it falls to distinguish between cases involving false or misleading statements, and situ-
ations involving a decision merely to remain silent"); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,801, at 87,596
n.8 (July 8, 1985) (SEC stated that Greenfield wrongly decided and issuance of "no corpo-
rate development statement" was violation of rule 10b-5 when corporation engaged in
merger negotiations); see also Comment, Corporate Disclosure of Merger Negotia-
tions-When Does the Investor Have a Right to Know?: Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 36
SYACUSE L. REV. 1155, 1174 (1985) (suggesting it was error to find Heublein had not
breached duty not to mislead).
2 Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757.
33 Id.
3' See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.) (price and structure rule
best alternative), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711
F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Staffin but finding agreement in principle once price and
structure agreed upon); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 252, 258 (N.D. IlM 1985)
(litmus test for duty to disclose is agreement in principle); see also Comment, The Duty
Not to Disclose v. The Duty Not to Mislead During Merger Negotiations, 23 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 143, 162 (1988) (nondisclosure prior to price and structure is correct rule). But see
Note, supra note 8, at 745 (price and structure cannot provide for disclosure of all necessary
information).
"I See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.01, reprinted in 3
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,515, at 17,210 (1985) ("[f]requently [various preliminary nego-
tiations] require extensive discussion and study by corporate officials before final decisions
can be made,... [w]here adequate security can be maintained, premature public announce-
ment may properly be avoided"); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 402(a), re-
printed in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,124B, at 17,097-11 (1985) ("Occasionally, corpo-
rate developments give rise to information which, although material, is subject to rapid
change.... [I]t may be proper to withhold public disclosure until a firm announcement can
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ture rule encountered strong opposition from the SEC36 and was
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. 37
A sharper conflict arose concerning the appropriate issuing of
"no corporate development" statements. These statements are is-
sued pursuant to rules of the major stock exchanges requiring cor-
porations to explain unusual trading activity in their stocks.3 '
Three approaches were employed to determine whether or not the
issuing of a "no corporate development" statement was a violation
of rule 10b-5. One approach held that since negotiations were im-
material as a matter of law prior to an agreement as to price and
structure, the corporation was under no obligation to disclose
them.39 In contrast, a second approach advocated that a corpora-
tion violated rule 10b-5 by issuing a "no corporate development"
statement while engaged in preliminary merger negotiations. 40 Ad-
vocating a third approach, the Sixth Circuit held that once a cor-
poration issues any statement, the failure to disclose ongoing
merger negotiations is a violation of rule 10b-5.41
Basic Inc. v. Levinson
In light of the existing conflict among the circuits and the
SEC, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Basic Inc. v. Levin-
be made.").
" See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 987 n.16 (1988) (quoting Brief for SEC as
amicus curiae at 10; possibility of merger may be material); In re Carnation Co., Exchange
Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801 (July 8,
1985) (Heublein wrongly decided); Commission Submits Amicus Memorandum on Materi-
ality of Merger Talks, SEC NEWS DIGEST (July 29, 1985) (SEC reiterated long-standing view
that materiality may arise well before agreement as to price and structure).
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 986.
See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.03, reprinted in 3
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,513-57 (1985); AMERicAN STOCK EXCHANGE GUME § 404, re-
printed in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,124A-24B (1985); see also Greenfield v. Heublein,
Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1984) (common practice for New York Stock Exchange offi-
cial to request explanation for unusual trading activity of listed stock), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985).
"' See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756-57; see also Note, supra note 21, at 548 (arguing "no
corporate development statements" issued while engaged in preliminary merger negotiations
do not violate rule lOb-5).
" See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,592 (July 8, 1985).
4 See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejected price and
structure rule but held information regarding merger negotiations "becomes material by vir-
tue of a statement denying their existence"), vac'd, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988); see also Schlanger
v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (once corporation chose to
speak, duty to disclose otherwise immaterial merger negotiations arose).
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son.42 The plaintiffs in Basic were former Basic shareholders who
had sold their stock following Basic's public announcement deny-
ing its involvement in merger negotiations.43 Plaintiffs alleged that
they had sustained a loss through sale of their Basic stock as a
result of a market artificially depressed by Basic's public denial of
merger negotiations." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
had rejected the district court's ruling that merger negotiations
were immaterial as a matter of law, holding instead that negotia-
tions, which may have been immaterial prior to any disclosure, are
rendered material by virtue of a statement denying their
existence.45
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun purported
to settle the existing conflict by expressly adopting the TSC test
for all questions of materiality arising under section 10(b)/rule
10b-5 claims. 46 The Court approved the Texas Gulf Sulphur bal-
ancing test 47 and its underlying policy as the appropriate test in
determining the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations.4 s
The Court endorsed a case by case, fact intensive materiality in-
quiry, rejecting a "bright line" test and the rationale that led to its
development. 4 The Court further rejected the Sixth Circuit's con-
tention that otherwise immaterial factors become material upon is-
suing a statement denying their existence.50 Finally, the Supreme
Court distinguished between the materiality of the information
and the timing of the duty to disclose it, declaring that the Basic
case did not concern the timing of disclosure issue.51 It is submit-
ted that while the Supreme Court may have closed the door on the
42 479 U.S. 1083 (1987).
"' Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 981 (1988). Prior to the announcement of the
merger, Basic had issued three public statements denying involvement in any merger negoti-
ations, and professing that the corporation could not explain the unusually high volume
trading of its stock. Id. at 981 & n.4.
1, Id. at 981. Plaintiffs sold their stock after Basic's first denial of merger negotiations.
Id.
4' Basic, 786 F.2d at 749.
" Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983; see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
17 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
48 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 987.
" Id. at 986, 987-88.
80 Id. at 986. The Court found that adoption of the Sixth Circuit's rule "would be ...
insensitive" to plaintiff's burden in a 10b-5 claim to show that statements were misleading
regarding a material fact. Id.
11 Id. at 985 ("[a]rguments... that some disclosure would be 'premature'... are more
properly considered under the rubric of an issuer's duty to disclose").
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"bright line" test for materiality, it failed to provide a standard by
which corporations may appropriately structure their disclosure
policies.
THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Timing of the Duty to Disclose
The Supreme Court in Basic distinguished the question of ma-
teriality of information from the question of when disclosure of
such material information is required, but failed to address the lat-
ter issue.5 2 The distinction between the duty to disclose and mate-
riality in a 10b-5 claim has been frequently noted.53 Some courts
and commentators have suggested that once the materiality of a
fact is ascertained, the requirement of disclosure necessarily fol-
lows. 5 4 While under the generally accepted rule corporations do not
have an affirmative duty to disclose,5 5 this general rule is subject to
certain exceptions." In applying the rule to early merger negotia-
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (estab-
lished view that rule 10b-5 requires both duty to disclose and material facts), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros., 744 F.2d 978, 984 (3d Cir. 1984) (material facts
must be disclosed only if "duty to speak exists").
54 See Bauman, supra note 3, at 937 (urging adoption of affirmative duty to disclose). A
few courts have also suggested that an affirmative duty to disclose exists generally. See, e.g.,
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) (rule 10b-5 makes no distinction
between materiality and duty to disclose, and unless "some doctrine limits [corporations']
duty to disclose" they will be liable for nondisclosure); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.) (absent valid business purpose for nondisclo-
sure, duty to disclose arises provided information is "ripe"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973); Issen v. GSC Enters., 538 F. Supp. 745, 751 (N.D. IM. 1982) (broadly interpreting
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), to find an affirmative duty to disclose all
material facts arising out of special relationship between corporation and shareholder). See
generally Talesmick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation
Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DEN. L.J. 369 (1973) (discussing basis for
affirmative duty to disclose, but suggesting breach gives rise only to injunctive relief).
'5 See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982) (generally no affirmative
duty to disclose); see also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (corpora-
tion has alternative "to disclose or abstain from trading" its own stock), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1053 (1977).
5" See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (duty to disclose arising
from insider trading); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984) (duty to
disclose if corporation is trading its own securities), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) (duty to disclose if
company is source of rumors concerning it); see also Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative
Duty to Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Busi-
ness Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1250 (1985) (even if general rule is that affirmative disclosure
is not necessary, exceptions have "eat[en] up the general rule").
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tions, courts and the SEC have blurred the distinction between
materiality of the information and the duty to disclose it by hold-
ing that once the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations is
established the duty to disclose arises.5 7 It is suggested, therefore,
that courts have implicitly linked the questions of materiality and
of the appropriate timing of disclosure in developing their policies
for the required disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations.
Thus, by failing to address the question of when the duty to dis-
close material information arises, the Supreme Court answered
only one-half of the issue actually presented. This incomplete dis-
position will precipitate situations where a fact may be concededly
"material," yet there will remain an issue as to whether or not the
corporation has a duty to disclose it. It is asserted that the Court's
incomplete disposition will serve only to focus the inquiry concern-
ing corporate disclosure upon the issue of duty to disclose, rather
than materiality. This is a dubious result considering that regard-
less of whether the inquiry is termed "duty to disclose" or materi-
ality, the salient factors will likely be identical.
The Corporate Quandary
The need for the establishment of a time for disclosure on
which corporations may rely has been recognized.58 The Basic
court quickly dismissed this concern by emphasizing that the se-
curities laws' fundamental purpose of complete disclosure is para-
mount to considerations of managerial comfort and ease of applica-
tion of a disclosure policy. 9 It is submitted, however, that these
two concerns are not mutually exclusive, but instead, are intrinsi-
cally dependent on one another. Corporations, left with a tenuous
'7 See, e.g., Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756 (no obligation to disclose until agreement as to
price and structure); Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207 (duty to disclose exists once agreement in
principle has been reached); In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,006 (June 16, 1986) (duty to disclose in
Tender Offer Recommendation Statement once agreement in principle is reached); see also
Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 56, at 1259-62 (courts require affirmative disclosure
once preliminary merger negotiations deemed material); Note, supra note 8, at 737 n.36
(affirmative duty to disclose merger negotiations once agreement in principle is reached de-
parts from long-standing view of no affirmative duty to disclose).
51 See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir.) (time for disclosure
should be readily ascertainable), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987).
1 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 985. The Court recognized that a "bright line" test would be
easier to apply than a case-by-case approach, but in rejecting this approach the Court de-
clared that "ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purpose of the securi-
ties acts and Congress' policy decisions." Id.
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standard upon which to formulate their disclosure policy, are likely
to adopt either an over-expansive or an under-expansive disclosure
policy in an attempt to protect themselves. The risks of overly
broad disclosure are threefold. First, by adopting such a disclosure
policy, corporations risk liability for the premature disclosure of
contingencies that never come to fruition.60 Additionally, by dis-
closing preliminary plans, a corporation may incur an ongoing duty
to update that information when circumstances change in order to
prevent the previous disclosure from becoming misleading. 1 Fi-
nally, a substantial risk exists to the investing public that corpora-
tions will "bury [investors] in an avalanche of trivial informa-
tion,' ' 62 thereby defeating the very purpose of disclosure.
In the alternative, corporations could opt for a more restrictive
disclosure policy based on their "business judgment" as to what a
reasonable shareholder would consider important."3 This alterna-
tive, however, leaves the corporation vulnerable to lengthy and
costly litigation, with little hope of disposition prior to a full trial."
It is submitted that courts have improvidently failed to provide
corporations with the necessary and safe middle ground between
these two unsatisfactory disclosure policies.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A holding that misstatements or omissions are "immaterial as
a matter of law" is essentially an application of summary judgment
to the issue of disclosure in the context of the securities laws.65
The Court in Basic implicitly endorsed the application of summary
judgment to disclosure questions by remanding the case for a de-
o See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
01 See Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (duty to correct prior
statements which become misleading due to subsequent events), rev'd on other grounds, 607
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see also Bauman, supra note 3, at
963 (corporation should have duty to update previous disclosure if could be misleading to
investors relying without update); Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 56, at 1251 (duty to
correct statements that become misleading); Note, supra note 8, at 741-43 (discussing basis,
extent, and impact of duty to update).
62 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976); supra notes 21-22 and
accompanying text.
63 TSC, 426 U.S. at 449 (information material if reasonable investor would have consid-
ered misstated or omitted fact significant). This is the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court for ascertaining the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations. See supra note 46
and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
05 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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termination of "whether a grant of summary judgment [was] ap-
propriate on [the] record."68 Summary judgment in federal courts
is to be granted if there exists "no genuine issue as to any material
fact. '67 The Supreme Court recently spoke on the appropriate ap-
plication of summary judgment in both Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp."" and Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc."' The Court set forth a two step inquiry to determine
whether summary judgment is warranted: first, the fact in issue
must be "material," interpreted to mean potentially determina-
tive;70 and second, the issue regarding that fact must be "genuine,"
interpreted to mean one on which a reasonable jury could differ.71
Substantive law determines whether a given fact is "material"
for purposes of summary judgment.72 Since liability pursuant to
10(b)/10b-5 requires a showing that the misstatement or omission
" Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The rule provides, inter alia: "IT]he judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.
68 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Matsushita reversed the Third Circuit's denial of a summary
judgment motion, indicating that summary judgment could be used to prevent unduly costly
and unnecessary trials. See id. at 574; Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Re-
cent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 185-87 (1987). See generally Sherman,
The Matsushita Case: Tightened Concepts of Conspiracy and Predictions, 8 CARDozo L.
REV. 1121, 1123-24 (1987) ("Matsushita has 'signal[ed] a marked change from the reticence
to grant summary judgment of' " prior case law (quoting Apex Oil Co. v. Dimauro, 641 F.
Supp. 1246, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 489 (1987))). Matsushita holds that summary judgment will be appropri-
ate if equally plausible inferences may be drawn from the evidence if the party opposing the
motion falls to offer more evidence to support his position. See 475 U.S. at 597. But see
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (reiterating long-held caveat that
all possible inferences must be drawn in favor of non-moving party). See generally Note,
Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REv. 491, 501 (1988) (dis-
cussing problems with broad reading of Matsushita).
" 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Anderson is critical in that it requires a court evaluating a mo-
tion for summary judgment to consider the standard of proof which would be applied at
trial. Id. at 252; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (judge must
consider burdens of proof).
For our purposes, Anderson is most important for its definition of the standard to be
applied to motions for summary judgment. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, Sum-
mary Judgment, 100 HARv. L. REv. 250, 256 (1986) (Anderson is. important for providing
framework upon which to analyze summary judgment motions); see also Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1114 (1986) (Anderson and Matsushita do little more
than endorse summary judgment standard already applied by "thoughtful courts").
70 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
71 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
72 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
was material,73 the materiality of the misstatement or omission will
always be determinative. 74 Therefore, it is submitted that the ma-
teriality of a misstatement or omission in section 10(b)/rule 10b-5
actions will always be "material" so as to defeat the first step to-
wards summary judgment.
However, summary judgment is still appropriate if the moving
party establishes that no "genuine issue" regarding that material
fact exists.75 In providing the standard for genuineness, the Ander-
son Court analogized summary judgment motions to motions for a
directed verdict and applied the test of whether a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.78 In applying such
a test, all "inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ...
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. ' 77 The mere possibility that a jury may infer that a
fact is material is sufficient to defeat a summary judgment mo-
tion.78 In section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 actions, the materiality of mis-
statements or omissions is based on whether or not a reasonable
71 See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1015 (1986). For a discussion of the necessary elements of a 10(b)/10b-5 action, see
3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.91 (1973); Bauman,
supra note 3, at 943.
71 See supra note 73.
75 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (summary judgment appropriate
only if no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (moving party has burden of showing absence of genuine issue
of material fact); Dreher v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1143 n.4 (7th Cir. 1980) (same) (citing
Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973)); Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1974) (generally accepted
that movant has burden of establishing absence of genuine issue). Courts have had difficulty
defining what is genuine. See Note, supra note 68, at 491; see also Louis, supra, at 746
(insufficiencies in standard courts apply to determine whether to grant summary judgment).
76 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. The Court declared that the primary difference
between summary judgment and a directed verdict is procedural. Id.; see also United States
v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (moving party entitled to
summary judgment if established facts and presumptions would have entitled him to di-
rected verdict); Childress, supra note 68, at 186 (Supreme Court intends summary judgment
motion to parallel directed verdict motion); Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in
the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 774, 783 (1983)
(standard for summary judgment should be same as that applied to motion for directed
verdict).
' Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962)); see, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157 (evidence of moving party construed in light
most favorable to opposing party); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980) ("party
opposing summary judgment is entitled to 'the benefit of all reasonable doubts'" (quoting
10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2727, at 551 (1973))).
78 See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159.
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investor would have considered them important.79 It is asserted
that since these actions are frequently instituted by disgruntled
shareholders, a jury may infer that the plaintiff considered the
omitted or misstated fact important. Therefore, since minimal evi-
dence is necessary to give rise to a "genuine issue," and the action
was commenced by either a presumably reasonable shareholder or
the SEC, materiality will consistently present a "genuine issue"
within the meaning of the rules for summary judgment.
Thus, it is submitted that Basic Inc. v. Levinson, read in con-
junction with Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., sets forth a test for
the disposition of section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 actions which will virtu-
ally preclude courts from granting summary judgment in such ac-
tions. Since section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may be the most litigated
provisions of all the securities laws, 0 curtailing the use of summary
judgment in such actions will unnecessarily burden the judicial
system with time-consuming and costly litigation.81
CONCLUSION
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court confronted the
question of a corporation's duty to disclose preliminary merger ne-
gotiations but addressed only one facet of this duty, the material-
ity issue. In reaffirming the TSC materiality test, the Court pur-
ported to settle the existing conflict among the circuits; however,
the case by case, fact intensive approach endorsed by the Court
fails to provide corporations with an effective means of establish-
ing disclosure policies and virtually precludes application of sum-
70 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
80 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("Rule 10b-5
[is] a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn"); SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) ("§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws"); see also Jacobs, supra note 6, at 243
(rule 10b-5 is "most powerful and most widely-used tool in the federal arsenal of securities
remedies").
8' See, e.g., Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Bork, J., dissenting) (limiting trial judges' authority to grant summary judgment will waste
court time and increase cost and procedural burdens), rev'd sub noma. Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Cole, 633 F.2d at 1092 (court of appeals expressing sympathy to
overburdened district court compelled by precedent to deny summary judgment); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (summary judgment
important to avoid long and expensive litigation); see also Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984)
(recent explosion of litigation resulted in overburdened courts and increased costs); Sonen-
shein, supra note 76, at 810 (rule 56 designed to be applied to every type of case).
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mary judgment. Although ease of application is not the Court's
primary concern, a rule that corporations cannot effectively em-
ploy fails to serve the interests of all those involved, particularly
those of the investor.
Joyce Shulman-Kanciper
